Abstract-Using a proprietary data set of credit bureau records, CohenCole (2011) finds evidence that lenders are using the racial composition of a borrower's neighborhood to set credit limits on revolving accounts. Using the same credit bureau data, I revisit this work and reach two main findings. First, an undocumented decision in constructing the variables appears to have introduced a distortion that is highly correlated with neighborhood racial composition and appears to increase the size of the reported disparity. Second, when neighborhood income is controlled for, the results presented as evidence of redlining disappear.
I. Introduction C OHEN-COLE (2011, hereafter referred to as CC) examines the possibility that lenders may be setting credit limits based in part on the racial composition of a borrower's neighborhood. He finds evidence that revolving credit lines decrease as the minority share of a borrower's neighborhood increases and concludes that ''the net effect is lower access to credit in black communities' ' (p. 708) . Since using the racial composition of a borrower's neighborhood to establish credit limits is a clear violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), this is a potentially important finding that would indicate that much of the credit card industry is violating federal fair lending law.
Because of the seriousness of these charges and the proprietary nature of the data, I sought to replicate and evaluate CC's results. This paper documents my efforts and highlights two main findings. First, an undocumented decision by CC in constructing his variables appears to have introduced a distortion that is highly correlated with neighborhood racial composition and increases the size of the reported disparity. Second, I find that when controls for neighborhood income are added to the estimations, the results presented as evidence of redlining disappear. For example, while CC finds that moving an individual from an 80% majority white to an 80% majority black area reduces credit by an average of $7,048, I find that when neighborhood income is controlled for and the previously mentioned distortion is corrected, such a move appears to increase credit by a statistically insignificant $12.
1 When a few other neighborhood characteristics are controlled for, this difference increases to a statistically significant $1,000. The remainder of this paper, which details my analysis of CC, is organized as follows. The next section discusses the process of replicating the data set that CC used and examines how a design decision made in constructing the variables used may have affected the sample size and ultimately the reported results. Section III replicates some of CC's estimations and examines the robustness of the results to control for neighborhood characteristics, such as income. Section IV concludes by discussing what is learned from these analyses about credit card redlining.
II. Data and Variable Creation
The data CC used come from a nationally representative sample of anonymous individual-level credit bureau records. These data are a subset of a larger data set maintained by the Federal Reserve Board and were supplied to CC by Federal Reserve Board staff with the consent of the credit bureau. Because I have access to the original data set that he received, I have been able to replicate CC's results.
The first column of table 1 provides the means and medians CC reported for the variables used in this analysis. The second column provides the same information from my replication of CC's data set (referred to hereafter as the replicated data set). For most variables, the reported and replicated values are identical; however, there are notable exceptions.
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The most notable exception is the credit score, for which the mean and median reported by CC are both about 50 points below the values for the replicated sample. While I have been unable to determine the source of this difference, there are two reasons to suspect that the reported values may be in error. First, despite the fact that the credit score takes on only integer values, the median that CC reported is a decimal.
3 Second, the mean and median credit scores for the replicated sample exactly match those calculated from the data set that was originally e-mailed to CC.
Two other exceptions, median rent and median house value, are derived from the 2000 Census. CC states that census-derived values are assigned by ''finding the block group in the census data that lies the shortest distance to the credit file location'' (p. 705). However, the computer code that CC has posted to the Internet indicates that these values were instead constructed based on averages of all census block groups within a 1-mile radius of coordinates in the bureau data. 4 Both methods of constructing census-derived variables were used in preparing this article, and the 1-mile radius approach provided a better match (in most cases, reproducing exactly the values that CC reported). It is difficult to ascertain, however, how the 1-mile-radius approach can be applied to median values such as rent or house values. For these variables, using the closest block group appears to provide closer estimates than a weighted average of medians or other methods that were tried based on a 1-mile radius. For this reason, I use the median values from the nearest block group even though they do not exactly reproduce the values that CC reported.
The final exception is the percentage of the population listed as employed in the 2000 Census, where the reported values are 20 percentage points higher than those from the replicated sample. The replicated values are consistent with the national and state-level figures reported by the Census Bureau (Clark & Weismantle, 2003) , which indicate that the employment share was 60%. The values CC reported are also well below the share of the civilian labor force that was employed in 2000 (94%). I have been unable to reconcile the reported and replicated values for the employment variable.
An apparent consequence of these exceptions is that the number of observations available for use in the estimations differs substantially. Of the 586,800 observations in the full sample, CC uses 227,425, or 39%, because of missing values. The replicated sample used in this paper contains about 64,833 fewer observations with missing values. Consequently, the replicated sample contains 292,308 observations.
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This sample is used to estimate equations for two different dependent variables summarizing each individual's revolving credit accounts. The first variable, LIMIT, measures the aggregate dollar amount of the revolving credit lines that an individual maintains. 6 The second supply measure, AVAILCREDIT, measures the portion of a person's aggregate credit lines that is not used; that is, it is the difference between LIMIT and the aggregate balances on the accounts. CC maintains that subtracting aggregate balances from credit limits removes any demand effects, making AVAILCREDIT a measure of credit supply. Similarly, any differences in LIMIT, after controlling for aggregate balances, are interpreted as supply differences.
Both of these supply measures are modeled as a function of a contemporaneous credit score and the racial composition of an individual's neighborhood (with, as mentioned, the addition of a control for balances in the LIMIT estimations). Differences in LIMIT or AVAILCREDIT across neighborhoods with varying racial compositions, after controlling for credit scores and other factors, are attributed to redlining by revolving credit issuers. As a robustness check, additional information is added to the estimations, including each person's age from the credit bureau data and information about the location of payday lenders.
A. The Effect of Design Decisions
An earlier version of this analysis (Brevoort, 2009 ) discusses in detail the process of constructing the variables and documents how design decisions in this process affected the results CC reported. These include CC's decision to assign individuals to census block groups based on distance rather than using the assignments provided by the credit bureau, which resulted in the exclusion of almost 50,000 observations, primarily from rural or coastal areas. For brevity, this analysis focuses on the most important design decision in terms of both the number of observations it excludes and the magnitude of its effect on the results.
This decision was to construct a measure to represent aggregate balances on revolving accounts instead of using the measure provided in the credit bureau data. The original credit bureau data supplied to CC contain three summary measures about the revolving accounts of each individual: aggregate balances (BAL), aggregate credit limits (LIMIT), and the utilization rate (UTIL%). For reasons that he does not provide in the paper, CC appears to discard BAL, the measure of aggregated balances provided by the credit bureau, and instead calculates UTIL$ : LIMIT Â UTIL%. This substitution of UTIL$ for BAL affects both the calculation of unused credit lines as
and estimations of LIMIT, where UTIL$ is used as a righthand-side variable.
For readers who are unfamiliar with the data, BAL and UTIL$ may appear to be identical measures; however, they are different in two potentially important ways. First, for individuals who have no revolving accounts, the utilization rate is undefined, so neither UTIL$ nor AVAILCREDIT can be calculated. Consequently, the use of UTIL$ instead of BAL excludes from the estimations individuals without revolving accounts. This exclusion effect appears to be the cause of most of the missing observations that CC reports, as neither BAL nor LIMIT is missing for any observation.
The practice of redlining has traditionally involved lenders' indicating on maps in red those areas into which they will not extend credit. Therefore, the decision to exclude individuals who have not obtained any revolving credit from an investigation of redlining appears questionable. Indeed, the individuals who are excluded from the estimations solely because of this restriction appear to reside in neighborhoods with characteristics that generally heighten concerns about the potential for redlining. Specifically, they have lower incomes, larger minority populations, and lower education levels (as shown in column 4 of table 1). However, one could also argue that many of these individuals may not have applied for revolving credit, and therefore their lack of accounts may not indicate that they were unable to obtain credit. Therefore, removing those individuals who did not have revolving credit does have some justification.
The second difference is much less transparent and results in a distortion of the values used in estimation (''distortion effect''). The summary measures supplied by the credit bureau are designed to be used in constructing creditscoring models and occasionally use somewhat inconsistent definitions across variables. In this case, the definition of a ''revolving account'' that the credit bureau used to calculate UTIL% is more restrictive than that used to calculate LIMIT or BAL (which use identical definitions). The main difference is that large revolving accounts are excluded from the calculation of the utilization rate. 7 An example of this, using one of the observations in the data, is presented in table 2. As shown in the top panel, which lists the information provided by the credit bureau, this individual has two open revolving accounts: a home equity line of credit and a credit card. While LIMIT and BAL are calculated using both accounts, UTIL% reflects only the credit card account. As a result, the measure of aggregate balances that CC calculates, UTIL$ (shown in the bottom panel), is $21,050, which understates the aggregate balances on these two accounts by $25,279. Similarly, AVAILCREDIT overstates the amount of unused credit lines, as calculated by LIMIT À BAL, by an identical amount.
8 Such examples are not uncommon. About 13% of the estimation sample was affected by the distortion effect, with a mean understatement of aggregate balances for those affected of over $20,000. Since CC does not discuss this issue, the rationale for replacing the balances reported by the credit bureau with UTIL$ is unclear. However, it is possible to examine how this decision may have affected his results. As shown in panel A of figure 1, UTIL$ appears to understate BAL more for people with larger accounts (as measured by LIMIT). Because people in low-minority areas tend to have more credit, balances are understated relatively more in lowminority neighborhoods, as shown in panel B. And since AVAILCREDIT is calculated using UTIL$, this measure overstates the amount of available credit in low-minority neighborhoods by identical amounts. Using UTIL$ in place of BAL therefore appears to inflate credit availability in low-minority neighborhoods. In the next section, I examine how the exclusion and distortion effects affected the reported estimation results and examine how robust these results are to controlling for neighborhood income. 7 Although I do not know with certainty the reason for these different definitions, it seems likely that the credit bureau is attempting to limit the impact of home equity lines of credit on the utilization ratio. The average utilization rate for the large revolving accounts that are excluded from the definition of UTIL% is 46% in our sample compared to 20% for included accounts. If utilization on large accounts is less predictive of future credit performance, then the bureau might want to exclude them from the utilization variables supplied to model builders.
III. Estimation Replication and Robustness Evaluation
CC reports the results from two general specifications. The first specification involves single equation estimations of AVAILCREDIT and LIMIT that model these variables as linear functions of credit score and %BLACK. The second specification is similar to the first, except that these estimations include an interaction term between %BLACK and credit score (%BLACKÂSCORE), as well as additional control variables in some cases. As a result, the effect of neighborhood racial composition is allowed to vary across individuals according to their credit score in the second specification. I discuss each of these specifications in turn.
A. Models without Interaction Terms
The first column of tables 3 and 4 reproduces the coefficients CC reported for the baseline models without the interaction between %BLACK and credit score, using AVAILCREDIT and LIMIT as the dependent variables, respectively. The adjacent columns then present the results from identical specifications using the replicated data set.
The replicated sample results are similar but not identical to those reported by CC. In particular, the replicated coefficients on credit score are lower than their reported values. This is consistent with my earlier finding that the mean and median credit scores CC reported are lower than the values from the replicated data set. Aside from this difference, the coefficients in the replicated estimation have magnitudes and statistical significance levels that are consistent with the reported results.
When LIMIT-BAL is used as the measure of unused credit lines, instead of AVAILCREDIT (table 3, column 4) or BAL is used in place of UTIL$ in the baseline estimation of LIMIT (table 4, column 4), the coefficient on %BLACK becomes noticeably smaller. Because the sample used in estimation was restricted to include only individuals for whom UTIL$ could be calculated, this decline is entirely attributable to the distortion effect caused by replacing BAL with UTIL$. It is also notable that the R 2 statistic for the estimation of LIMIT increases from 0.38 to 0.57 when BAL instead of UTIL$ is used as a control. This substantial increase in explanatory power is consistent with the use of UTIL$ having introduced a distortion in the measure of aggregate balances.
If we also include individuals without revolving accounts (and those who had only large revolving accounts), the coefficient on %BLACK falls further (column 5 of tables 3 and 4). This additional decline can be attributed to the exclusion effect from using UTIL$. Combined, the decision to calculate UTIL$ instead of relying on the measure of aggregate balances supplied by the credit bureau appears to have increased the size of the reported racial effect by 42% in the AVAILCREDIT estimation and 35% in the LIMIT estimation.
While the decision to use UTIL$ instead BAL appears to have increased the size of the reported racial effect, altering this decision does not eliminate the disparity, and, in fact, it remains significant at the 1% level in the estimations of both AVAILCREDIT and LIMIT. To test whether these results are robust to controlling for neighborhood income, I estimate an additional model that controls for income using the same group of fourteen income variables as CC did, each showing the share of the population in the income ranges defined by the Census Bureau. To demonstrate that the results that follow are not dependent on including people without revolving accounts, I restrict the sample to observations for which UTIL$ could be calculated.
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When these income controls are added, the results that CC presents as evidence of redlining disappear. In the estimations for both AVAILCREDIT and LIMIT, the coefficient on %BLACK goes from being negative and significant at the 1% level to being small and statistically insignificant. At the same time, the coefficients on the neighborhood income variables are jointly significant at the 1% level in both estimations.
These results suggest that CC's findings are not robust to the inclusion of a control for neighborhood income. Furthermore, the conclusion that CC draws based on the reported coefficients-that moving an individual from an 80% majority white neighborhood to one that is 80% majority black reduces credit by $7,048-appears to be largely driven by differences in income across neighborhoods. When neighborhood income is held constant and the distortions from using UTIL$ are corrected, such a move appears to increase credit by a statistically insignificant $12. With the addition of other controls for neighborhood characteristics (described in table 1), this move increases credit by a statistically significant $1,000.
The lack of robustness of these results is surprising in light of the fact that CC includes these same neighborhood income controls in selected estimations. However, all of the reported estimations that include income controls also include the interaction term %BLACKÂSCORE, so it is impossible to compare the results with income controls in tables 3 and 4 with comparable estimations from CC. The next section evaluates the estimations that CC reports that include %BLACKÂSCORE to examine whether the importance of the neighborhood income controls is mitigated by the inclusion of this interaction term.
B. Models with Interaction Terms
CC estimates several equations that include the interaction term %BLACKÂSCORE. Rather than replicate all of these results, I start with the most parsimonious model that includes this interaction term and then add the income and other Census-based control variables that CC used. The results of these estimations are provided in table 5 for AVAILCREDIT and table 6 for LIMIT. The columns in these tables correspond to the ordering in tables 3 and 4.
The results with %BLACKÂSCORE are more difficult to interpret than those without this interaction. The opposing signs on %BLACK and %BLACKÂSCORE imply some ''break-even'' credit score below which individuals will be helped by redlining-that is, they have more credit available than they would have had their neighborhood's minority concentration been lower-and above which they will be harmed.
CC does not mention the existence or importance of this break-even credit score. Instead, he focuses on the fact that the ''race penalty,'' which is the difference between the amount of credit each person has and the amount each person would have had in an identical all-white neighborhood, is ''greater for individuals with better credit histories' ' (p. 709) . This statement is true in that the derivative of the race penalty with respect to credit score is always positive. However, this does not account for the fact that the race penalty will be negative below the break-even score. Consequently, a positive derivate on the race penalty may mask the relationship between neighborhood racial composition and LIMIT or AVAILCREDIT.
This relationship can be seen in the panel A of figure 2, which replicates CC's second figure. For individuals with credit scores above the break-even level of 435, the race penalty (shown in the figure as the difference between the solid and dashed lines) is positive, meaning that they receive less credit than they would have had if they lived in an all-white neighborhood with otherwise identical characteristics. For individuals who have credit scores below 435, however, the race penalty is negative. Since very few individuals have credit scores that are this low and since the race penalty for scores below this level is relatively small, this is not necessarily a problem.
However, as shown in panel B of figure 2, when income controls are added to the estimation (column 5 of table 6), the break-even credit score increases to 614. This generates a more nuanced race penalty that can assume large positive or negative values depending on an individual's credit score (though the derivative of the race penalty remains positive). As shown in figure 3, neighborhoods with high minority concentrations generally have mean credit scores below this break-even level, suggesting that, on average, individuals in these neighborhoods will have higher credit limits than they would have received had their neighborhood been all white.
This pattern is evident in the data. Using the estimated coefficients from each model, I calculate the race penalty for each individual in the estimation sample. As shown in panels A and B of figure 4, the replicated baseline results (column 2 of tables 5 and 6) imply that the average race penalty is positive for all neighborhood racial compositions, with neighborhoods with the highest minority concentrations experiencing the largest race penalties. However, when income is controlled for, the picture becomes more muddled as the average race penalty for most high-minorityconcentration neighborhoods becomes negative or statistically insignificant (see panels C and D of figure 4). Furthermore, when all of the Census controls that CC used are added (as in column 6 of tables 5 and 6), the race penalty becomes overwhelmingly negative in high-minority-concentration neighborhoods. This implies that individuals in these neighborhoods, on average, are receiving more credit than would have been available to them had their neighborhood been all white (but otherwise identical).
The estimations that include %BLACKÂSCORE appear to confirm the results from the previous section that did not include this interaction. When neighborhood income is controlled for, the evidence of systematically lower levels of AVAILCREDIT or LIMIT for individuals in high-minority areas seems to disappear. Additionally, when the full set of Census controls is added, the results are consistent with more credit availability in minority communities.
This result is difficult to reconcile with CC's finding of systematically lower access to credit in black neighborhoods. Unlike the estimations without %BLACKÂSCORE that were discussed in the previous section, CC reports estimation results that include both this interaction term and income controls (along with the other Census control variables used in this paper). In fact, the estimation results that include the full set of Census controls (column 6 of tables 5 and 6) replicate estimations reported by CC, though they are free of the distortion effect produced by using UTIL$ instead of BAL.
FIGURE 4.-ESTIMATED RACE PENALTY BY NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL COMPOSITION
Each panel is based on a local-linear regression of neighborhood racial composition on fitted values of the race penalty using a gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.05. Fitted values of the race penalty were calculated for the estimation sample using the results in columns 1, 5, and 6 of table 5 for panels A, C, and E, respectively, and using columns 1, 5, and 6 of table 6 for panels B, D, and F. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors derived from residual bootstraps with 10,000 replications.
11 CC does not report results that include only the income controls, so we cannot compare the results presented in column 5 of tables 5 and 6.
The results that CC reports for these same estimations imply break-even credit scores of 647 for AVAILCREDIT and 622 for LIMIT. While these are somewhat lower than the break-even scores implied by the estimations here (672 and 660, respectively), much of this difference can be accounted for by CC's use of UTIL$. Additionally, since the mean and median credit scores CC reported are both about 50 points below the values for the replicated sample, it would appear that a larger portion of his sample should experience a negative race penalty than the analysis here would suggest. Consequently, the patterns observed in panels E and F of figure 4, should be largely reflective of the estimation results that are reported by CC. However, by focusing exclusively on the positive derivative of the race penalty, CC appears to overlook that the credit flows implied by his regression results contradict his conclusion of less credit availability in minority communities.
IV. Conclusion
This paper evaluates the evidence that Cohen-Cole (2011) presented that issuers of revolving credit set credit limits based in part on the racial composition of a borrower's neighborhood. While this analysis suggests that the conclusions in that paper are problematic, it would be premature to suggest that revolving credit is being allocated without regard to race or ethnicity. There are several reasons to suspect that the econometric approach's ability to detect redlining activities is limited. Two reasons are particularly important.
First, the econometric approach appears to rely on assumptions that are implausible. Specifically, CC argues that in subtracting balances from credit limits, as he does when constructing AVAILCREDIT, he ''removes demand on a one-for-one basis from the system'' (p. 706) so that any remaining disparities can be attributed to supply. Yet if two individuals each get credit cards with identical limits, and one runs up large balances while the other charges nothing, the value of AVAILCREDIT for these two individuals will be very different. This difference is unrelated to the supply decision of the lender. Consequently, the assumption that disparities in AVAILCREDIT can be attributed solely to supply is almost surely wrong.
Similarly, CC attributes differences in aggregate credit limits, after controlling for aggregate balances, to supply factors. But aggregate credit limits will depend heavily on the number of credit cards or home equity lines a person chooses to maintain (subject, of course, to the willingness of lenders to extend credit), and this will depend on both demand and supply effects (Gross & Souleles, 2002a ).
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For example, an individual's decision to close a credit line will decrease aggregate credit limits not as a result of a supply shock but because of a decision made by the consumer.
The second reason that the econometric approach is suspect is the endogenous nature of some of the independent variables. For one, there is reason to doubt that aggregate balances are exogenous predictors of credit limits. Particularly for credit-constrained individuals (such as people living in redlined neighborhoods where the provision of credit is kept low), balances may be limited by the credit available on open accounts and the borrower's ability to obtain additional revolving accounts from other lenders. Consequently, balances may be an endogenous function of credit limits.
There is also ample reason to be concerned about the endogenous nature of the credit score used. Rather than using an individual's credit score at the time the credit limits were set by the lender, 13 CC uses a credit score that was calculated on the same date as the dependent variables (AVAILCREDIT and LIMIT). Since both of these dependent variables are inputs into the calculation of a credit score, 14 it is difficult to see how a contemporaneous credit score can be considered an exogenous predictor of these variables.
The use of a contemporaneous credit score is equivalent to doing a study of racial bias on the math section of the SAT while using total SAT score as a right-hand-side variable measuring a student's intellectual ability.
15 Two students with the same SAT score but different math scores must also differ in their performance on the verbal section. Even if math scores are orthogonal to race, regressing math score on total SAT score and a race variable can yield a statistically significant coefficient on the race variable if there is a correlation between race and verbal scores. This would lead to the faulty inference that math scores vary by race.
This methodology potentially suffers from the same problem. Two individuals with the same credit score but materially different credit limits must differ on the other characteristics that comprise a credit score (such as past delinquency). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007) has established that many of these other characteristics are correlated with both race and the racial composition of an individual's neighborhood. Finding a statistically significant coefficient on neighborhood racial composition, when controlling for a contempora-12 When the credit limit on a revolving account is unreported, the highest balance ever on that account is used. According to Avery, Calem, and Canner (2004) , this will affect approximately 46% of individuals in the sample. This will further muddle the demand and supply influences on the credit limit variable. 13 Other studies use credit scores from before credit decisions are made to avoid problems of endogeneity. For example, Gross and Souleles (2002b) use a lagged credit score and the Board of Governors (2007) uses credit scores as of June 2003 to examine changes reflected on credit bureau accounts after that date.
14 In a VantageScore, the three variables used in this study (aggregate credit limits, balances, and utilization rates) represent half of the six characteristic types that comprise their model. Together they account for 45% of the score (see http://www.vantagescore.com/about/vantagescore_ model). Fair Isaac (2007) also reports that ''amounts owed,'' which includes all three of these variables in one group, accounts for 30% of a FICO score.
15 I thank Bob Avery for coming up with this analogy.
neous credit score, may reflect a correlation between race and the other factors that comprise the credit scoring model even in the absence of a causal link between credit limits and neighborhood racial compositions. Because of these issues with the econometric approach, it is very difficult to make definitive statements about whether issuers of revolving credit are engaging in redlining activities based on the results of this analysis. Nevertheless, equal access to credit remains an important public policy issue. Practices such as redlining that limit credit availability for minorities or other demographic groups can have substantial negative consequences for an individual's ability to establish a credit history, finance an education, own a home, or accumulate wealth. Efforts aimed at detecting the existence of such practices represent valuable contributions not only to the literature but also to furthering public policy goals. Whether issuers of revolving credit are engaging in redlining practices remains an open question that deserves serious study.
